A deliberação é um objetivo louvável quando a política é um acordo já feito? A esfera pública habermasiana e a legitimidade em uma era de mercado da formulação de políticas educacionais by Pappas, Liza N.
 
 
Journal website: http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/   Manuscript received: 1/30/2016 
Facebook: /EPAAA  Revisions received: 8/11/2016 
Twitter: @epaa_aape  Accepted: 10/11/2016 
 
 
education policy analysis 
archives 
A peer-reviewed, independent,  







 Arizona State University 
                 Volume 24 Number 121                December 5, 2016                        ISSN 1068-2341 
 
 
Is Deliberation a Laudable Goal When Policy is a Done 
Deal? The Habermasian Public Sphere and Legitimacy in a 
Market Era of Education Policymaking 
 
Liza N. Pappas 
Minnesota State University, Mankato 
United States 
 
Pappas, L. N. (2016). Is deliberation a laudable goal when policy is a done deal? The Habermasian 
public sphere and legitimacy in a market era of education policymaking. Education Policy Analysis 
Archives, 24(121). http://dx.doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v24.2409  
 
Abstract: The state mandated public hearings concerning school closing proposals in New York 
City provide a window into a diverse set of policy actors and their deliberations. Opposition to 
school closures is often cast as entrenched interests, emotional attachment, support for the status 
quo or at worst negligence. However, content analysis reveals that testimony offered by parent, 
community, and educator leaders contained a range of substantial critiques of school closing 
proposals, their motivations, justifications, and expected results. I argue that the hearings did not 
fully constitute a public sphere by Habermasian criteria, nor a counterpublic by Fraser and Dawson 
criteria. In fact, the hearings had contradictory effects; one school successfully fought closure by 
both resisting and reifying neoliberal logic in education policymaking. Some data demonstrates that 
this school’s market-based argument resonated with state authorities, while other data indicates that 
this market-based argument coincided with the state’s own interest to defend its legitimacy in 
policymaking. 
Keywords: deliberation; public hearings; school closure policy; Habermas; community; race; 
neoliberalism 
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¿Una deliberación es un objetivo louvável cuando una política es un acuerdo ya hecho? Una 
esfera pública que tiene una legitimidad en una era de mercado de la formulación de 
políticas educativas 
Resumen: En cuanto a las auditorías del Estado sobre las propuestas de fechamiento de las escuelas 
en la ciudad de Nueva York, hay una ventana para un conjunto diverso de atores políticos y sus 
deliberaciones. Argumento que como audiencias no constituyen totalmente una esfera pública por 
criterios de Habermasian, ni un "contrapúblico" por los criterios de Fraser y Dawson. De facto, 
como audífonos tienen los efectos contradictorios; Una escuela con un éxito no fechado de un año 
para resistir y reificar una lógica neoliberal en la formulación de políticas educativas. Algunos datos 
demuestran que el argumento se basa en las autoridades estatales, en tanto que otros datos indican 
que este argumento se basa en la formulación de políticas. 
Palabras clave: decisión; audiencias públicas; política de cierre de la escuela; Habermas; comunidad; 
raza; neoliberalismo 
 
A deliberação é um objetivo louvável quando a política é um acordo já feito? A esfera 
pública habermasiana e a legitimidade em uma era de mercado da formulação de 
políticas educacionais 
Resumo: As audiências públicas do Estado sobre as propostas de fechamento de escolas na 
cidade de Nova York fornecem uma janela para um conjunto diverso de atores políticos e suas 
deliberações. Argumento que as audiências não constituíram totalmente uma esfera pública 
pelos critérios de Habermasian, nem um “contra-público” pelos critérios de Fraser e Dawson. 
De fato, as audiências tiveram efeitos contraditórios; uma escola lutou com êxito no 
fechamento daquele ano por resistir e reificar a lógica neoliberal na formulação de políticas 
educacionais. Alguns dados demonstram que o argumento baseado em mercado desta escola 
ressoou com as autoridades estatais, enquanto outros dados indicam que esse argumento 
baseado no mercado coincidiu com o próprio interesse do Estado em defender sua 
legitimidade na formulação de políticas. 
Palavras-chave: deliberação; audiências públicas; política de encerramento escolar; Habermas; 
comunidade; raça; neoliberalismo 
Introduction 
Closing schools that are struggling to graduate students has become the policy of choice, 
particularly in large urban school systems. School closure advocates contend that closing the 
“failing” school removes it as the default option, and thereby facilitates families’ better selections for 
their children’s education (Kowal & Hassel, 2008). In comparison, opponents argue that school 
closure policy is not an effective solution for struggling schools and that it is a destructive policy for 
students, their schools, and their communities (Communities for Excellent Schools, 2010; Journey 
for Justice, 2014; Kirshner, Gaetner, & Pozzoboni, 2010). An increasing number of studies point out 
that closures are effective only to the extent that students subsequently attend better performing 
schools (Brummet, 2014; Carlson & Lavertu, 2015; de la Torre et. al, 2015; de la Torre & Gwynne, 
2009; Enberg, J., Gill, B., Zamarro, G., & Zimmer, R., 2012; Ozek, Hanson, & Gonzalez, 2012). 
School closure policy is not a new strategy for school districts, nor is the controversy that 
surrounds it. From the late 1930s through the 1980s, administrators readily introduced school 
closings to remedy budget shortfalls (Cibulka, 1983), resist desegregation plans (Ely, 1976), and 
redress declining enrollment (Colton & Frelich, 1979). In each of these time periods, as is the case 
today, many communities vehemently opposed school closings. Much of the historical literature that 
discusses community opposition characterizes it as a concern for the loss of relationships and 
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identity (Berger, 1983) – an emotional rather than a practical or cogent argument. Opposition to 
school closings today, as before, is often framed as acceptance of the status quo (Hill, Campbell & 
Gross, 2012).  
What is novel about school closure policy today is the extent to which urban school districts 
across the United States have been promoting it as a core strategy to address chronic low-
performance, defined by both graduation rates and standardized test scores. For this case, school 
administrators have had the ideological backing of the No Child Left Behind Act (the federal law in 
effect from 2002 to 2015), which ushered in an era of high stakes testing, and sanctions for schools 
and teachers. Efforts to close schools have also been boosted with funding from the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Race to the Top program, which allocated $4.35 billion in competitive 
funding to states to restructure schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). In 2011-2012, there 
were nearly 2000 schools closed across the country (U.S. Department of Education, 2015) with large 
urban school districts like New York City and Chicago (Ahmed-Ullah, Chase, & Sector, 2013) 
leading the way.  
While financial incentives have proved effective in encouraging school districts to close 
schools they deem “failing,” perhaps what has been more influential is the mindset that school 
failure is the school’s alone. School closure policies are devoid of an understanding or a recognition 
of the larger political economy in which schools operate (Anyon, 2005). School closure policies, for 
instance, do not acknowledge decades of state disinvestment (Lipman, 2012), the exodus of white 
middle class communities and their resistance to school integration (Scott & Rand, 2014), nor 
decisions that have outsourced support services to private and unaccountable networks (Ball, 2009) 
and stripped schools of experienced teachers and other resources pivotal to school success 
(Cucchiara, 2013). By contrast, school closings both reflect and operationalize a market logic (Apple, 
2001a). Market advocates in public education vow that the problems facing schools are inherent in 
the monopolistic structure of public schooling (Chubb & Moe, 1990). They insist that a free market 
system based on competition, minimal regulation and parent-choice would provide greater quality at 
a lower cost, even when the evidence that market reforms in education are effective is unclear 
(Belfield & Levin, 2002), and despite counter evidence that demonstrates that race and class 
inequities are reproduced through market mechanisms like choice and competition (Gulson, 2011).  
A number of critics charge that school closure policy is less a policy about improving 
schools and more a policy to facilitate the privatization of public education, what is increasingly 
recognized as neoliberal education reform (Apple, 2001b; Lipman, 2011; Ravitch, 2013; Thiem, 
2009). They have pointed out that closed schools are increasingly taken over by charter school 
operators (Lake, 2010; Weiss & Long, 2013; Zehr, 2011) which are under no obligation to abide by 
union rules (teacher autonomy, collective bargaining rights, etc.) nor other public accountability 
measures including budget reports, student discipline guidelines, and channels for parent voice such 
as parent associations. Others have alleged that closures serve larger neoliberal economic policies in 
alignment with urban neighborhood gentrification and racial re-segregation plans (Lipman & Haines, 
2007; Means, 2008; Saltman, 2010; Scott, 2011). This occurs through the seizure of public assets and 
the displacement of income deprived, politically disenfranchised communities of color.  
In November 2009, then New York City (NYC) Mayor Michael Bloomberg declared that he 
would replace the bottom 10% of low performing schools in the remaining years of his third term in 
office. During the three months that followed, thousands of New Yorkers headed to state mandated 
public hearings to contest twenty proposals to close large comprehensive high schools across NYC. 
NYC Department of Education (NYCDoE) administrators insisted that school closings would 
ensure better educational options and outcomes for students. However, parent and community 
leaders, elected officials, union representatives and educators expressed outrage over a lack of clarity 
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of closure proposals, including consistent criteria for identifying struggling schools, clear and 
sufficient replacement plans for students, as well as a genuine invitation for their input.  
How can the divergent ways that school and community leaders view school closure policy 
be better understood? How effective was the public hearing process in engaging a broader public in 
a pivotal discussion about solutions for struggling schools? What counterarguments stick in this 
market era of education policymaking? In this article, I apply philosopher Habermas’ theoretical 
underpinnings of the public sphere (1962, 1984), and critiques by contemporary deliberative 
democracy theorists Fraser (1990) and Dawson (1995, 2006), to answer these questions, and to 
consider the gap between the ideal of deliberation and the reality of the policymaking process. I 
analyze a multitude of assertions by diverse members of the public at select school closing public 
hearings, the constellation of those assertions across stakeholders and school communities, and 
responses from education administrators post hearings. Moreover, in light of one school 
community’s ability to fight off school closure with a market-based argument, I consider how 
communities can both resist and reify neoliberal logic in education policymaking. Ultimately, I 
question the usefulness of deliberation when policymaking is a done deal. This article builds on 
previous inquiries into communities’ influence over school closure policy (Finnigan & Lavner, 2012; 
Kretchmar, 2011). It also extends the empirical application of Habermasian theory in contemplating 
community participation in deliberative political processes (Chang & Jacobson, 2010). 
NYC Context: School Governance, Mayoral Control, and Public Hearings 
For most of New York City’s history, school governance consisted of an independent 
central board appointed by the mayor and local school boards appointed by the central board. For a 
thirty-five year period between 1968 and 2003, however, New York City elementary and middle 
schools were governed by locally elected community school boards that had some jurisdiction to 
appoint and remove superintendents, as well as veto or accept the superintendent’s choice of 
principals (Gitell et al., 1972). The 1969 legislature called this reorganization of the school system 
decentralization as it limited the power of the mayor, and replaced the central school authority with a 
seven-member board. Five board members were appointed by each of the borough presidents, and 
two were appointed by the mayor. This form of decentralization also provided for the election of 32 
community district (neighborhood designated) school boards with parent and community 
representatives. New Yorkers still vigorously debate the efficacy of this governance arrangement. 
Some charge that it led to nepotism and dysfunction within the public schools (Rogers, 2009). 
Others maintain that this level of community control allowed administrators, teachers, and parents 
to work together in creating sustainable school improvement (Lewis, 2013). 
In 2002, when Michael R. Bloomberg was elected mayor of New York City, the state 
legislature supported abolishing the decentralized governance structure. In its place, Bloomberg 
created a school governance structure composed of a mayoral-appointed Chancellor and a thirteen-
seat advisory body, the Panel on Education Policy (PEP).1 Bloomberg used the term accountability as 
the key rationale for these governance changes; the mayor and his staff upheld that in the former 
decentralized system there was a diffusion of authority that created dysfunction and paralysis. 
Mayoral control, they reasoned, allowed them to define expectations, set standards, and measure 
                                                 
1 The PEP replaced the Board of Education, and is comprised of eight mayoral appointees and a 
representative from each of the five boroughs. While the PEP has voting power to approve policy changes, 
budgets, and contracts, early on in Bloomberg’s first administration, limits on the PEP’s independence were 
revealed when Mayor Bloomberg replaced three appointees who stated they intended to vote against his 
proposal. For more on the 2004 incident known as Monday massacre, see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/nyregion/bloomberg-wins-on-school-tests-after-firing-foes.html.   
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results. From the perspective of diverse members of the public, the school closing process was a 
gauge for how the Mayor and the education policymaking process at large was accountable to them 
or not (Ravitch, 2009).  
The public hearing process concerning school closures is itself a recent development in New 
York City school governance. In 2009, the New York State legislature amended the Mayoral control 
law to promote more community participation in school decision-making. This was done in 
response to widespread concerns about the lack of transparency, information access, and 
opportunities for public input under Mayor Bloomberg’s administration in his first term, and three 
specific demands issued by a citywide coalition of community groups, the Campaign for Better 
Schools (C4BE). The previous governance law required the New York City Department of 
Education to consult with the affected community district education council before closing or 
substantially changing schools. However, the renewed law requires the Chancellor to (1) prepare an 
educational impact statement2 for any proposed school closing or significant change in school 
utilization (including a phase out, grade reconfiguration, re-siting, or co-location of schools), and (2) 
to conduct a public hearing about any closing proposal in cooperation with the affected community 
district education council (CEC).3 In addition, under the 2009 legislation, NYCDoE is required to 
officially submit all proposals to the PEP, the Mayor’s advisory body, for approval. The one-year 
extension of the Mayoral Control law in 2016 renews this legislation.  
By the end of 2009, some six months after Mayoral control had been re-authorized by the 
state legislature, the NYCDoE announced the closure of 20 schools, including 15 comprehensive 
high schools, in four separate announcements made over one week’s time. On the morning of 
December 2, 2009, NYCDoE announced the closure of four schools – two high schools and two 
middle schools. At the end of that same workday, they announced the closure of four more high 
schools. Five days later, on December 7, the Department announced the closure of an additional 
nine schools (six of them high schools), and a week later they announced the proposed closure of 
three more high schools, bringing the total to 20.4 In an email to reporters, NYCDoE spokesperson 
Will Havemann wrote that the Department was proposing to phase out schools that had “failed to 
advance student learning,” and that in accordance with the new governance law each proposal would 
be followed by a public comment period of 45 days.5  
                                                 
2 Educational Impact Statements are to include: the current and projected pupil enrollment of the affected 
school, the prospective need for such school building, the ramifications of such school closing or significant 
change in school utilization upon the community, initial costs and savings resulting from such school closing, 
the potential disposability of any closed school; the impacts of the proposed school closing or significant 
change in school utilization to any affected students; an outline of any proposed or potential use of the school 
building for other educational programs or administrative services; the effect of such school closing or 
significant change in school utilization on personnel needs, the cost of instruction, administration, 
transportation, and other support services; the type, age, and physical condition of such school building, 
maintenance, and energy costs, recent or planned improvements to such school building, and such building’s 
special features; the ability of other schools in the affect community district to accommodate pupils following 
the school closure or significant change in school utilization; and information regarding such school’s 
academic performance including whether such school has been identified as a school under registration 
review, requiring academic progress, a school in need of improvement, or a school in corrective action or 
restructuring status. 
3 For more on community district education councils, see: 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Offices/CEC/GPInformation/CommunityEducationCouncils/one.htm 
4 This was 13 more schools proposed for closure than the year before. 
5 http://gothamschools.org/2009/12/02/city-announces-plans-to-shut-four-failing-public-schools/ 
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Theoretical Framework  
This article draws upon the theoretical contributions of Jurgen Habermas (1962, 1984) to 
investigate the conditions and institutional arrangements that best enable public participation, 
deliberation, and the accountability of democratic decision-making bodies. Habermas’ notion of the 
public sphere (1962) has been rightly criticized for assuming that all members can deliberate as if 
they were social equals (Fraser, 1990), and for not acknowledging the central role power plays in 
governance and policymaking. Still, I use the public sphere framework as well as Habermas’ theory 
of communicative action and validity claims (1984) to consider how deliberation takes shape in the 
school closing hearings and becomes a struggle over legitimacy there. I also evaluate whether the 
public hearings constituted counterpublics (Dawson, 1995; Fraser, 1990), and consider the influence 
of the market authority in today’s current era of education policy-making, particularly how its logic 
enters into deliberation.  
The Public Sphere 
Sociologist and philosopher Jurgen Habermas’ (1962) defined the public sphere as “made up 
of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state” 
(p. 176). For Habermas, the public sphere mediates between individual’s private concerns and the 
intrusion of powerful institutions; it is a social place where individuals can deliberate their common 
interests, as well as be critical of the state. In this way, it serves a dual function to hold the state 
accountable to public opinion and later, to transfer public opinion through more formal 
participatory channels in government. In his analysis, Habermas identified three institutional criteria 
by which public spheres must abide in order to be effective: disregard of status, domain of common concern, 
and inclusivity.  
By disregard of status, Habermas argued that an individual’s humanity ought to be emphasized 
in the public sphere rather than their social or economic position in society. This principle, 
Habermas theorized, “leveled the playing field” during rational deliberation or argumentation. 
Domain of concern referred to the necessary space for individuals to discuss affairs that are not subject 
to the “monopoly of interpretation” of the church or state authorities. Habermas underscored that 
independence from the state and other institutionalized bodies is important for individuals to 
develop their own opinions. Lastly, inclusivity means “everyone had to be able to participate” (p. 37); 
for Habermas, inclusivity realizes democratic ideals by achieving an all-encompassing public. With 
these three criteria met, Habermas theorized that the public sphere could facilitate the accountability 
of decision-making bodies, not by violence, coercion, order of bureaucracy, or incentives of the 
market, but by “the unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas, 1984, p. 147).  
Validity Claims 
In the public sphere, Habermas further explained that participants could best direct and 
assess deliberation through moral, critical, and rational criteria – what he termed “validity claims” 
(1984, p. 301). Validity claims were grounded in a moral-practical reasoning situated in the everyday 
experiences of individuals, and according to Habermas, ought to cover four dimensions: 
intelligibility, truth, normative rightfulness, and sincerity. Speech acts can also be rejected under each 
of the four aspects [ibid, p. 307]. In total, these four criteria for Habermas realize ‘an ideal speech 
situation’, and further ensure that deliberation not fall to self-interest, prejudice, or political 
affiliation. Intelligibility refers to semantic clarification but also contextualized knowledge so that all 
participants understand the language spoken (p. 89). Truth refers to assertions and explanations that 
reflect reality. Normative rightfulness recognizes prevailing norms, and sincerity reflects an expression of 
intention (p. 90-91).  
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By Habermas’ account, in deliberation a collective agreement is achieved when all 
participants would, if asked, answer yes to each criterion, and any policymaker attempting to 
communicate with the general public would not achieve understanding unless his or her validity 
claims are fully accepted. Even if a policymaker subjectively believed that his or her position is valid, 
mutual understanding would not be realized to the extent participants raise challenges with any of 
the four validity claims. Habermas pointed out that validity claim challenges give rise to typical 
questions. For example, if the intelligibility of a speech act is challenged, the question “what do you 
mean by that?” would be raised. If the truth of a speech act is challenged, questions such as “are 
things really as you say” or “why are things that way and not some other way?” would be asked. If 
the normative rightfulness of a speech act is challenged the question would become “what is your 
justification?” Finally, if in the context of the interaction, there is question about sincerity, questions 
such as “are you deceiving me?” or “are you deceiving yourself?” would arise. Importantly, validity 
claim challenges, in general, raise questions about the legitimacy of any speech act, presumably 
important to any speaker. But in other writings, Habermas noted that the desire for legitimacy was 
often associated with “a political order’s worthiness to be recognized” (1979, p. 178). Referring to 
the state’s inability to control fluctuations in the economy, Habermas expounded that a 
legitimization crisis occurred at times when there is a decline in public confidence. Table 1 below 
outlines the four validity claims, their domain of focus, and challenges as outlined by Habermas. 
 
Table 1 
Habermas’ Four Classes of Validity Claims 
   
Criteria Domain of Focus Challenge 
Intelligibility Contextualized Knowledge/ 
Comprehensiveness 
What is the argument? 
What do you mean by that? 
   
Truth Facticity What is the basis? Are things 
really as you say they are? 
   
Normative 
Rightfulness 
Positional Authority What is the justification? By 
what authority is your action 
the right action? 
   
Sincerity  Intention of Truth (or Deceit) What is the intention? Are you 
deceiving me or yourself? 
 
 
Criticisms of the Public Sphere Context 
Habermas’ vision of the public sphere has drawn criticism from feminist, critical race, and 
civil society scholars (Abu-Haidar, 1999; McLaughlin, 1993) for minimizing the reality and impact of 
economic, racial, and political relations on forms of participation. Political scientist Nancy Fraser 
(1990) argues that “subaltern counterpublics” —rather than one public sphere—offer a deliberative 
space and process for those who have marginal status to identify their interests apart from the state’s 
interests and interpretations, as well as from those more dominant and privileged members in the 
public sphere. Fraser promotes these counterpublics as crucial spaces for withdrawal and 
regroupment from the larger public sphere, as well as training grounds for “agitational activities” 
toward the wider public (68). Like Fraser, Dawson (1995, 2006) contends that in a stratified society, 
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counterpublics are necessary for the widening of contestation, as well as for the vitality of politically 
subordinated groups. Dawson was cautious, however, about the ability of any counterpublic to 
effectively inject its framework into the larger political system, and to influence state power from an 
isolated position. For example, Dawson (2006) concluded that the Black counterpublic in New 
Orleans was unable to influence the larger society in the United States to recognize and redress 
Hurricane Katrina’s disproportionate devastation on communities of color.  
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere and the critiques put forth by Fraser and Dawson 
are useful for theorizing the public hearings concerning school closings in New York City in the 21st 
century. While some have argued that “there is no better way to ensure the long-term success of 
public involvement than to institutionalize a decision-making role for that involvement” (Thomas, 
1995, 163), others warn that the institutionalization of public engagement diminishes the pressure 
outside groups can leverage on the system. The question that continues to engage deliberative 
democracy scholars is what kinds of processes and strategies effectively facilitate the public’s impact 
on policymaking. Like Anderson (1998), I acknowledge that the public sphere is a contested site that 
can serve as collusion for more dominant groups, but which also “contain transformative 
possibilities for the creation of more authentic approaches to participation” (p. 574).  
The state mandated public hearings concerning school closing proposals provide a window 
into a diverse set of policy actors and their deliberations. I argue that the hearings did not fully 
constitute a public sphere by Habermasian criteria, nor a counterpublic by Fraser and Dawson 
criteria. In fact, the hearings had contradictory effects; one school successfully fought closure that 
year by both resisting and reifying neoliberal logic in education policymaking. I present data that 
demonstrates that this school’s market-based argument resonated with state authorities; but I also 
present data that indicates that their market-based argument coincided with the state’s own interest 
to defend its legitimacy in policymaking. 
Methods 
This article is part of a larger ethnographic study that investigated how key institutional 
actors framed school closure policy in New York City under the Bloomberg administration. 
Methods for the larger study included interviews and surveys of actors; observations of select 
organizational meetings and school closing public hearings where they intersected; and analysis of 
documents. For this article, transcripts of the school closing hearings along with field notes were the 
primary data sources. Select interviews with district and school staff are also consulted for purposes 
of triangulation (Mathison, 1988).  
Hearing transcripts were provided by the New York City Department of Education. 
Hearings selected for this article focus on three of the twenty high schools proposed for closure in 
school year 2009-2010. The three schools were selected for the large attendance size of their public 
hearing (between 500-800 persons) as well as diversity in their geographic representation (they are 
located in three different boroughs across NYC.) In accordance with IRB regulations, the schools 
are not referred to by name, but by the pseudonyms School A, School B, and School C. Schools A 
& B are comprehensive high schools and School C is a career and technology high school. In 2009-











Populations by School (2009-2010) 
  
School Population 
School A 1, 474 
  
School B 1, 017 
  
School C 1, 096 
 
Data Analysis 
I use content analysis to identify assertions provided by members of the public in three 
school closing hearings in the 2009-2010 school year. Transcripts were analyzed in two stages, using 
Atlas TI software. Transcripts were coded first by speaker: how individuals who testified introduced 
themselves at the microphone (speakers who did not introduce themselves were coded not-
identified or “NI”). Transcripts were then coded for arguments made by each speaker. More than 
125 codes of specific phrases, sentences, or passages were initially generated from the three 
transcripts using an open coding framework (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). From the 125 initial 
codes, 25 axial codes were identified across all three hearings, which were then collapsed into five 
larger themes of arguments against school closings. In the next section, I briefly review how the 
NYCDoE introduced school closing proposals, and then I provide results from the content analysis 
for the public comment periods at each of the three hearings. 
 
Case Study of Select School Closing Public Hearings (2009-2010) 
At the start of each school closing public hearing in 2009-2010, NYCDoE administrators 
read a brief statement introducing each closure proposal. The introductory statements were the only 
oral remarks made by administrators at the hearings that year; they offer a glimpse into how the 
Department framed school closings. As Sunderman and Payne (2009) point out, when school 
districts propose closings, there are certain assumptions regarding the policy’s aim and outcome. The 
NYCDoE statements, for example, convey assumptions that school closings will result in increased 
student graduation rates (School A); continue the prior “remarkable success” of phasing out schools 
and opening new ones (School B); and “change the way the building is organized” (School C). These 
statements also carry implicit assumptions that previous school closures and opening schools were 
indeed successful, producing higher graduation rates, for example; and that changing the way the 
building is organized will yield better student outcomes. 
  













    
Proposal 
Introduction 
“This is a proposal to 
transform a school from 
one that is not 
graduating many children 
to one that is achieving 
this objective.” 
“Over the past 4 years the 
Department has phased out 
over 90 schools, and we 
have opened 335 new 
schools that have 
demonstrated remarkable 
success. This proposal will 
continue that important 
work.”  
“This is not a proposal to 
close the school building; 
it is a proposal to change 
the way the building is 
organized.” 
     
Graduation 
Rate 
Graduation rate is low. 
 
Graduation rate is low and 
is declining. 
4-year graduation rate is 
well below city average. 
     
Progress  
Report 
Failing Progress Report 
grade. 
 Failing Progress Report 
grade. 
    
Enrollment Less than 100 students 
listed the school as their 
first choice on this year’s 
high school application. 
Enrollment is declining 
over the past 4 years. 
 
Applications to school 
have declined .6 points. 
    
Peer school 
comparison 
Peer schools serving 
similar students are 
getting dramatically 
better results. 
School is not achieving the 
same results as peer schools 
serving similar students. 
 
    
Replacement 
Plan 
New schools will replace 
this school over time, 
first taking a 9th grade 
and then growing as this 
school phases out. All 
students currently 
enrolled will have the 
opportunity to graduate 
from this school. All new 
schools would serve ELL 
& students w/ Special 
Education needs. 
No plans right now for a 
replacement school for 
September 2010. What we 
will do over next year is 
work with you and the 
larger community to plan 
for a replacement. All 
students enrolled will have 
the opportunity to graduate. 
Smaller schools will 
replace this school over 
time, first taking in 9th 
grade, and then growing 
as this school phases out. 
All students currently 
enrolled will have the 
opportunity to graduate 
from this school. All new 
schools serve ELL & 
students w/Special 
Education needs.  
    
Evidence 
Cited 
Students are falling 
behind early on. Under 
50% of freshman earned 
10 credits (opposed to 11 
credits to graduate on 
time). 
Organizational culture 
learning environment is 
deeply troubled. Only 65% 
of students reported they 
feel safe in school survey.  
Attendance rate is low. It 
is below the average for 
majority of schools in 
NYC. 
Note: The graduation rate, progress report, enrollment and peer school comparison are criteria referenced. 
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The inconsistency regarding the criteria for identifying schools to close was one of the 
critiques put forward by members of the public. The NYCDoE cited poor Progress Report6 grades 
for Schools A and C, but not for School B; freshman credit accumulation percentages in School A 
but not for Schools B and C; and the quality of organizational culture in School B, but not for 
Schools A and C. Organizational culture is not defined; the use of the adjective “troubled” and the 
reference to students’ perception of safety as reported on the school survey7 does not provide 
clarity. The Department referred to their peer schools index8 for School A and School B, but not for 
School C.  
Replacement plans void of details were also a cause for concern among varied members of 
the public. The NYCDoE read statements that did not include timelines or more information, only 
broad promises: new schools will replace School A and that smaller schools will replace School C. 
The statements did not ease public concern about which students new schools would serve, and if 
replacement schools would serve the same students who were attending or would have attended the 
schools, were they not closed. In the cases of schools A and C, administrators noted that the 
replacement schools would cater to students with specific academic needs, English Language 
Learners (ELL) and students entitled to Special Education services. No replacement plan is 
mentioned in reference to School B.  
In summary, administrators’ opening statements at school closing hearings in 2009-2010 
reiterated the department’s rationale that closing schools would yield better outcomes, such as 
                                                 
6 The Progress Report (PR) was an internal NYCDoE cumulative measurement that evaluated schools with a 
letter grade [A-F] in three separate areas: school environment, school performance, and student progress. In 
2009-2010 a school’s environment constituted 15% of its overall grade, by measuring student attendance as well 
as analyzing survey responses from parents, students, and teachers on their perceptions of school culture; 
performance accounted for 25% of the overall grade, based on the percentage of students scoring above average on 
the New York State ELA and math tests for elementary and middle schools, as well as graduation rates for 
high schools; student progress constituted a majority (60%) of the overall grade, measured by credit accumulation, 
course passing rates, and Regents exam completion. 
7 The NYC school survey has been administered annually since its inception in 2007. In 2009-2010 it 
contained four main sections: academic expectations, communication, engagement, and safety and respect. 
The section labeled “Safety and Respect” asked students 20 questions. Citywide survey responses are reported 
by percentages. For more on the survey, see: 
http://schools.nyc.gov/accountability/tools/survey/default.htm  
8 Peer Schools were defined as schools that serve similar populations in terms of grade span, demographic 
composition, and/or average incoming State exam scores. In 2009-2010 elementary and K-8 schools peer 
index was the weighted average of the percentage of students at the school eligible for free lunch (the Title I 
Free Lunch rate) (30%), percentage of Black/Hispanic students (30%), percentage of the student population 
with Individual Education Plans (30%), and percentage of the student population made up of English 
Language Learners (10%). The formula created a single score ranging from 0%-100%. Middle schools peer 
index operated on a 1.00–4.50 scale and was calculated using the following formula: Average student 
proficiency (based on the students’ fourth grade ELA and Math State test scores) minus (2 times  percentage 
of students with IEP’s) High schools were sorted by a peer index which operates on a 1.00–4.50 scale using 
the following formula: Average student proficiency (based on the students’ eighth grade English Language 
Arts (ELA) and Math State test scores) minus (2 times percentage of Special Education students) minus (2 
times percentage of Self-Contained special education students) minus (percentage of over-age students, or 
those students 16 years or older, as of December 31st of their ninth grade entry year.) When ranked by peer 
index, an elementary school, middle, or high school’s peer group consisted of the 20 schools above and20 
schools below it in the same school type category. A K-8 school’s peer group consisted of the 15 schools 
above it and 15 schools below it in the same school type category. 
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graduation rates. However, these statements did not specify how closing schools would actually 
achieve better outcomes. Administrators did not elaborate on factors troubling schools (nor of 
attempts to address those factors) and that justify closure. The inconsistency of criteria referenced 
raised more questions for members of the public. In the absence of detailed replacement plans, 
members of the public articulated that they had no clear understanding of how new schools would 
indeed generate better outcomes, especially for students at risk of not graduating.  
The following section offers an analysis of the content of the testimony made by diverse 
members of the public at the three hearings. As members of the public consistently stated, the 
rationale for school closings presented by the NYCDoE failed to address their concerns. While 
opposition to school closures is often cast as entrenched interests, emotional attachment, support 
for the status quo or at worst negligence, content analysis reveals that testimony offered by parent, 
community, and educator leaders contained a range of substantial critiques of school closing 
proposals, their motivations, justifications, and expected results. The testimony provided uniformly 
disputed the NYCDoE’s claim that school closings would provide better options and outcomes for 
students, as well as challenged the NYCDoE’s legitimacy in policymaking. Furthermore, in looking 
across hearings, analysis reveals how assertions issued by the public in each of the hearings come 
together or do not -- to form a larger force against mass school closure policy. Content analysis of 
testimony also provides insight into why members of the public still participated in a process 
deemed foregone. 
Analysis of Public Testimony: Diverse Participants and Assertions  
Following the introductory statements at the start of school closing public hearing in 2009-
2010, NYCDoE administrators read instructions on how the public comment period would 
function, stating simply that the “purpose of the public hearing was for members of the public to 
provide comment,” and that “each individual who signed up to speak would have 2 minutes at the 
microphone when called” (Fieldnotes, School B). Table 3 categorizes individuals who provided 
testimony in each of the three hearings presented in this article by the way they identified themselves 
at the microphone. From 57 different speaker identities, I created 12 more generalized “speaker” 
categories (column labeled “speakers”) and five overarching “speaker groups” categories (column 
labeled “speaker group”). 
  




Who of the “Public” Provided Testimony Opposed to School Closing Proposals? 
 
 



















Students Current Students 10 4 16 30 32% 
Alumni 14 9 21 44 
       
School Staff Administrators 0 1 8 9 28% 
Staff (i.e., Guidance 
Counselor, Coach) 
0 1 1 2 
Teachers 14 18 21 53 
       
Families & 
Community 
Parents/Family  5 3 4 12 10% 
Community 
Members 
3 8 0 11 






3 5 6 14 11% 
School Councils 
Members 
8 3 1 12 
       
Representatives Elected Officials 5 1 3 9 9.5% 
Union 
Representatives 
5 2 2 9 
Community 
Activists 
0 4 0 4 
       
N/I Non-identified 
(N/I) 
(10) (7) (5) (22) 9.5% 
 Total 77 66 88 231  
 
As depicted in the table, of the 231 speakers across the three hearings analyzed, 74 identified 
as either current or former students (32%) and 64 comprised staff at the schools proposed for 
closure, including administrators, teachers, guidance counselors and coaches (28%). Thirty-three 
speakers identified as families of students or community members (10%). Twenty-six persons were 
labeled as school partners, including school council members, and organizational partners such as 
businesses and community based organizations (11%), and 18 individuals identified themselves as 
United Federation of Teachers (UFT) representatives, elected officials, or activists (9.5%). An 
additional 22 persons (9.5% of total) did not identify themselves at the microphone. A diverse public 
overall participated in the public hearing process in 2009-2010, represented by at least 12 distinct 
speaker categories.   
 




Figure 1. Speaker group distribution by school community. 
 
Looking comparatively at the public hearings, there was a fairly even distribution of speaker 
roles by category. As represented in Figure 1 above, at School C, there were significantly more 
current students and alumni, and slightly more staff (in this case, teachers and administrators) who 
testified than in Schools A and B. At School A, more elected officials, union representatives, and 
school council members testified than in Schools B and C. At School B there were two times more 
community members who testified than at the other two schools.  
The next part of this article provides a fine-grained analysis of the five major assertions 
issued across three school hearings: a) these are not failing schools; b) there are other motivations to 
close schools; c) closing is not a solution; d) no supports were provided; and e) lack of accountability 
in the process. In Figure 2 on the next page, I demonstrate in descending order the categories of 
assertions made by those members of the public who testified in the three hearings. I break down 
each category of argument and then examine the distribution of arguments by school community. 
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“These are not failing schools.” The largest assertion that emerged from the three public 
school hearings analyzed for this article was “These are not failing schools.” One hundred and ten 
incidences of this assertion were coded across all three hearing transcripts, constituting almost half 
(47.6%) of all assertions made. Members of the public debated the accuracy of the data provided by 
the NYCDoE to signify failure; for example, educators presented school generated graduation rates 
that rivaled those of the department. They also contested the adequacy and comprehensiveness of 
the NYCDoE evaluation system to fully capture the quality, achievements, and progress of their 
schools. Members of the public proposed the NYCDoE utilize an alternate set of criteria to 
consider in school closure decisions, including student triumph over personal adversity, teacher 
dedication, student employability, and the significance of the school to the community and 
neighborhood. Finally, members of the public testified that schools proposed for closure were 
disproportionately charged with serving “high needs” students. To many members of the public 
who testified, the fact that these schools served so many high needs students (in relation to other 
schools) made comparison against any standard that did not take these disparities into account 
unfair.  The public summarized their view, exclaiming: “We are not failing, the DoE is failing us.” 
 
“Other motivations for closing schools.” Sixty-six persons (30% of all speakers) across 
the three public hearings disputed that the purpose of school closings was to improve school 
performance. Instead they argued that there were other motivations for school closings that had 
nothing to do with academic success: incentives for school privatization in the form of charter 
schools, preferences for small schools over large comprehensive and technical high schools, and 
larger plans for the gentrification of neighborhoods. Nearly 15% of persons who made claims that 
there were other motivations to school closings drew attention to economic and racial dimensions of 
school closure policy as well as disparate racial and economic impacts. Some made the claim that 
school closings were a product of, coincided with, and produced racialized re-spacialization of 
neighborhoods, with the building of new schools designed to attract whiter and more moneyed 
neighborhood inhabitants. Many members of the public also stated that schools identified for 
closure were based on an assessment of whether or not the affected school community was 
equipped to fight the closure. A former PTA President, for example, stated that administrators 
targeted neighborhoods with families who do not primarily speak English, who do not typically have 
political representation via the electorate, and who do not generally have political power to fight 
back against such decisions: “Because they think you’re not aware of what’s going on!” [Speaker, 
School A]. A mantra emerged in the hearings that the NYCDoE was closing schools by design. Members 
of the public charged that data had been manipulated to feign failure, provide an appearance of 
neutral data driven decision-making, and ultimately to justify the replacement of schools. 
 
“Closing schools is not a solution.” More than 65 individuals or 28% of speakers 
disputed NYCDoE’s claim that closing schools was an effective solution for schools that were 
struggling. While the NYCDoE rationalized that school closings would benefit students and school 
communities, members of the public argued precisely the opposite—that closing schools would 
harm students, school communities, and surrounding communities. Members of the public 
expressed specific concern for students who would get lost in the transition—especially students 
currently struggling in school. Increased drop-out rates, subsequent and increased jail or prison rates, 
and the message that “we are turning our backs on students” were projected areas of harm. Many 
remarked that closing schools would have a detrimental impact on neighborhoods, removing a 
pivotal resource, and a place for community connection, services, and support. Others warned of a 
cascade effect closings would have on nearby schools. In the words of a school council member 
who testified at School B, “Given the lack of a comprehensive plan for replacement high school 
seats, the closure of [this school] will have a negative impact on neighboring schools…overcrowding 
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them and diverting large numbers of students with great academic needs to them.” In the absence of 
clear and detailed school replacement plans, members of the public repeatedly asked, “where will 
students go?” The lack of replacement plans demonstrated little evidence that school closures would 
provide better choices, outcomes, and accountability. More than 90% of speakers who stated that 
closing is not a solution suggested that the Department invest more money in schools of concern, 
offer comprehensive and sustainable supports for students, teachers, and administrators, and work 
with the larger community to fix the schools, don’t close them. This indicated another area of disconnect 
between the NYCDoE and many members of the public: that there had been previous and strong 
enough attempts to assist schools now proposed for closure. 
 
“No support provided.” There were more than 50 assertions that schools did not have 
proper support—about 21% of the overall assertions across the three public hearings—to succeed. 
Members of the public did not accept the NYCDoE’s implicit premise that schools had been 
adequately resourced to meet academic standards set for them. There were many who also 
questioned the Department’s role and accountability in maintaining school performance. Speakers 
stressed that schools had lost resources and other school based supports in recent years. Students 
highlighted “a loss of AP courses”; teachers named “programs that were whittled away” and a 
“decrease of support staff.” One teacher in particular talked about her class size increasing at the 
same time that the school could not afford a paraprofessional to assist her [School A]. Moreover, 
speakers noted that the schools proposed for closure were those that historically had been 
neglected-schools located in economically and politically disenfranchised communities of color 
deprived of adequate and equitable supports for decades. Testimony also pointed to recent changes 
in the department’s management strategy that had shifted its school support services infrastructure 
from the central office to external contractors. There were questions about who exactly from the 
Department was responsible for working with schools now proposed for closure, and what specific 
supports had been provided. A borough appointed representative of the Panel for Education Policy 
asked why financial resources had not been provided prior to the decision to close the school. A 
UFT representative who attended all three hearings stated that schools were struggling due to the 
persistently failed management of the NYCDoE. Here too, members of the public turned the tables on 
the NYCDoE – stating that it was the institution that was failing. 
 
“Lack of accountability.” There were also 50 assertions about a lack of accountability in 
the school closing process, which accounted for 21% of all claims made. Where NYCDoE leaders 
professed that school closing proposals demonstrated accountability for educating children, 
members of the public countered that the proposals and school closing process had no real 
accountability to the larger public. They defined real accountability in two ways: how they were 
being heard and how the process was answering to them. It was not uncommon for actors at the 
microphone to single out any representative on the panel that presided over the school closing 
hearing. An assistant principal asked, “Where is the accountability of the superintendent?” A parent 
asked a DOE spokesperson, “what accountability will the DOE take?” And, in what would become 
a common response to the non-answerability of DOE administrators, one alumnus shouted at a 
deputy chancellor, “Get off your Blackberry!” Across three hearings, many speakers also lamented 
that the hearings were representative of a larger school governance structure that “ignores students, 
parents, and teachers.” “Where are Mr. Klein and Mr. Bloomberg?” demanded several people, 
referring to the then New York City Schools Chancellor and Mayor. “This is why I voted against 
Mayoral control,” remarked a state elected official. Lastly, accusations of non-accountability were 
not just specific to the school closing hearings and the larger education governance structure in New 
York City, but to the process of closing schools. “Breaking up the high school” in the words of one 
speaker “dilutes accountability rather than increases it. It makes the community less willing to invest 
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in education.”([School B]. Overall, many members of the public decried the process perfunctory and 
the proposals already “a done deal.” 
 
Summary. The assertions made across hearings offer insight into the grounds by which 
diverse members of the larger public contested the Department’s school closing proposals. Overall 
they contested the following NYCDoE’s claims: the schools slated for closure were in fact failing; 
school closure was in the service of improving academic performance; closure was a viable solution 
for schools struggling; schools identified for closure had been given the resources and support 
necessary to meet expectations; and school closing hearings and the education governance structure 
at large was accountable to students, their families and communities, and the public. In total, the 
assertions of the public revealed vigorous challenges to the legitimacy of the claims on which the 
NYCDoE school closing proposals were based.  
The question I answer next concerns the distribution of the five main assertions across 
school communities. I investigate support for assertions across hearings, asking whether particular 
assertions are distinctive to school communities or shared across hearings. Figure 3 below represents 
the distribution of assertions made within and across school communities. School communities A, 
B, and C were found to make fairly distinct assertions in their battle with the NYCDoE over school 




Figure 3. Assertions made across hearings. 
 
 
As Figure 3 demonstrates, school communities differed in the prevailing assertions they 
made in contesting school closure policy. In School A, speakers coalesced around the assertion that 
there are other motivations to close the school-namely privatization. No assertion dominated the 
School B testimony; the five assertions were distributed fairly evenly. School C by and large made 
the assertion that their school was not failing. In the next section of this article, I look within each 
school communities’ assertions more closely to consider whether certain arguments have more 
salience in the current market sphere of public education.  
Looking Closer Within School-Community Assertions  
As I have demonstrated, looking more closely at assertions across hearings revealed that the 




















CLOSING IS NOT A 
SOLUTION
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closing proposals. As mentioned earlier in the introduction, the three schools profiled in this article 
offer different education models for students. Schools A and B are comprehensive high schools 
focused on providing students a college preparatory education, whereas School C is a vocational 
school certifying students for work in mechanical and engineering trades. Assertions at School C’s 
public hearing converged on themes of employability and living wage jobs, as well as job creation 
and larger societal economic revitalization. Clearly, these are not assertions school communities A 
and B could make as directly, given their school models. Still, the market argument is worth further 
examination in of itself as School C was ultimately removed from the closure list, and school 
administrators named its argument as the most compelling in subsequent interviews. 
While Schools A and B made moral arguments for why their schools should not close (they 
had not been given adequate support, and closure would harm students and communities), School C 
largely made an economic argument: the school helps students secure jobs. At School C, more than 
30 speakers stated outright that the school was equipping students for living wage employment after 
graduation, and that the school’s placements of graduates in the trades was supporting the local 
economy and infrastructure. As an alumnus and current carpenter cleverly put it, “we believe in 
building schools, not closing schools down.”  
The importance of employable skills was pronounced for economically disadvantaged 
students attending the school. Several speakers who testified at School C emphasized that the school 
was located in one of the poorest congressional districts in the country and that it ensured 
“economically disadvantaged students to get hands-on instruction in their trade, thereby providing a 
way out of the poverty cycle” [Teacher, School C]. Several alumni also attested that the certificate 
they received from the school was “paying off,” offering how that pay off was computed in hourly 
wages and salary figures. For example, an alumnus and car technician reported he grossed $30,000 
part-time while taking college classes. “That's pretty good, if you ask me,” he remarked. Another 
alumnus relayed he earned close to $90,000 per year as a new business owner, adding, “I also bought 
my condo last year because of this school!”  
In addition to those who testified that the school was preparing students for living 
wage jobs, speakers made an argument not to close the school because of its unique 
contribution to the larger community’s economic revitalization. One assistant principal 
emphasized that school alumni held leadership roles in many projects throughout the city, 
proclaiming, “Of all the infrastructure projects going on in New York City right now, you 
have here in the audience graduates that are working on these projects.” Another assistant 
principal pointed out that the schools’ areas of trade were particularly important to the local 
workforce, and that the school was providing skilled workers to areas that were in demand, 
stating, “in today’s economy, the need for auto technicians and building trade workers may 
be more pressing than ever.” 
Several business owners too came forward to praise the school for teaching automotive, 
carpentry, electrical engineering, and heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) and to 
remind the NYCDoE that they held contracts with the city. A representative from a world-
renowned car company tallied that the school had placed 15 students in two local dealerships, and 
that his company had worked with more than 30 student interns in the course of their relationship 
with the school. A second prominent business owner read a list of names of billion-dollar 
companies and company owners whom he promised, “recognize the value of what’s being taught 
here and how valuable it is,” and also added that his company, like others, “would refuse to let 
[closure] happen to the school.”  
While Schools A & B argued that the NYCDoE ought to consider schools’ relationships to 
families and communities, School C argued that the NYCDoE ought to consider the school’s 
relationship to the local economy. While Schools A & B asserted that their schools stood as historic 
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landmarks, School C’s stressed that students’ futures rested with a school that was both filling and 
creating jobs. Lastly, while Schools A & B regarded the closure as a loss for the entire community, 
for School C, the loss of the school was calculated in market terms. One student summarized this by 
stating that closing the school would be “deteriorating our school, our opportunities, and our 
careers.” In summary, speakers at School C (school staff, students, alumni, and business partners 
alike) contested closure by appealing to a market-based framework for schooling. 
At the conclusion of the school closing proposal public hearing process in 2009-2010, 
NYCDoE took School C off the list.9 On March 3, 2010, based on community feedback and the 
demand for a continuation of the school’s automotive program, the DOE issued a revised 
educational impact statement for School C. Several administrators who agreed to be interviewed on 
reasons why School C had been removed offered similar explanations for this decision: School C 
had provided a compelling argument that the school had been successful at providing students with 
jobs, and building strong alliances with industry partners. In many cases, administrators 
distinguished the argument made at School C’s hearing as a unique example of adults who were 
speaking on behalf of students’ interests, and not their own. For example, the district 
Superintendent stated, “[Speakers at School C] all spoke about the importance of programs for kids, 
which is something the others did not do. The others were angry teachers upset about losing their 
jobs. This one has great community turnout that talked about the impact of school on lives after 
graduation…prepared kids for a productive life after they left high school. That was very rich, 
special, and what did it. We were able to reconsider because of that.”  
Another NYCDoE administrator present at School C’s hearing emphasized that School C’s 
community focused on the school’s ability to provide students with living wage jobs. This 
administrator noted that the community where School C was located was lacking in employment 
options and the school’s facility to successfully prepare students for jobs in that vacuum had made 
an impression on her:  
I’m always going to remember a group of kids that approached me and said, ‘Miss, 
you are going to take away the only thing that we have here in this neighborhood 
that’s giving us bread at home. We are graduates of the program, we’re making X 
amount of money, and without that, where we are going to be at right now? You’re 
gonna deny that opportunity to the rest of these kids that really need it?’ I tell you, it 
broke—these kids really spoke from the heart. And it’s true, [the school’s] programs 
were really working very good for those kids, in that community. So, I said maybe 
we shouldn’t phase out that school. 
 
A third administrator whom was interviewed, a Deputy Chancellor whom served on the 
Chancellor’s cabinet, pointed more directly to the role of industry partners in the decision to not 
close the school. This Deputy Chancellor expressed being captivated by business partners who had 
testified at the public hearing in support of the school and demonstrated having a meaningful 
partnership: “You know what made a difference there, the fact that the vice president of sales or 
whatever it was from BMW actually was there waiting his turn to speak. Didn’t bully his way up to 
the front of the line. When he spoke he spoke well, and he also could talk about the relationship that 
had been built there…so that I think was a big big deal.” A fourth NYCDoE representative, 
working in the Office of Portfolio Planning which developed all school closure proposals, also 
                                                 
9 Nineteen additional schools proposed for closure in 2009-2010 were approved by the PEP by a 9-4 vote. All 
eight Mayoral appointees voted in agreement, as did the borough representative from Staten Island. Unlike 
the other four boroughs, no school in Staten Island was proposed for closure that year. The remaining four 
borough appointees voted against the proposals. 
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acknowledged the criticality of industry voice in the department’s ultimate decision: “A lot of times 
[Career & Technical Education] schools have connections with the local unions because they hire a 
lot of the kids out of the program…there was a trades council that was in the area that got very 
involved and so we, in talking with them, decided to [change the school closing proposal],” she 
confirmed. 
These four interviews in total reveal the Department’s impression with business industry 
partners, as well as with the market aims of schooling—equipping students with tools to be 
economically viable in society. However, conflicting interview data emerged that offers an alternate 
explanation for School C’s avoidance of closure. A number of staff interviewed at School C said that 
they believed another factor had come into play to help their individual school case—the NYCDoE 
needing to protect its own legitimacy in policymaking. For example, the then principal of School C 
offered that from the beginning discussions of School C’s closure proposal, representatives from the 
Department of Education had sent signals it would save its automotive program:  
I’m telling you, before anything happened, and I don’t remember what—it was early 
in the school year that we had an assembly with all the teachers and the Board of Ed. 
came down and said...someone slipped and said maybe one of your programs could 
be saved and that may be the automotive program. So this was before the hearings, 
before anything. 
 
A variation of this explanation was also provided by one of the school’s teachers and members of 
the school leadership team who divulged some of what he had learned privately about the school 
closure policy process. He said he was invited to several conversations with NYCDoE 
administrators where a secret deal had been struck:  
A secret deal was struck in order to save [our school]. And part of the deal was getting a few 
people to actually, officially go on record and say there was a process and the process did 
actually work…And in reality the answer is no there is no true process, no the process 
doesn’t work, the PEP is a rubber stamp committee...they don’t ask real questions, they 
don’t evaluate anything, they don’t look at anything, they have no sense of the data. [The 
NYCDoE] needed someone to say yeah [the process] actually did work. And so we struck 
this backdoor deal, where a couple of business people and not-for-profits representatives of 
industry agreed to say, ‘yes there was really a process, and the process worked, and proof 
that the process worked is look they actually listened to the people at [our school].’ 
 
A recording of the joint public hearing on School C’s revised proposal on February 12, 2010 
meeting includes testimony from this school leadership team member attesting that the “DOE had 
listened to the community.” (Fieldnotes).  
In the discussion section, I return to Habermas’ public sphere construct and validity claims 
criteria, as well as Fraser and Dawson’s counterpublic theories to make sense of the contradictory 
data presented through and after the public hearings, and to evaluate whether state authorities are 
held accountable to the public via deliberation.  
Discussion 
Habermas’ construct of the public sphere helps us to recognize the potential of a larger 
public coming together to deliberate matters of common concern (proposed school closings), and to 
hold state authority (mayoral control) accountable. To recap, Habermas evaluated the efficacy of 
public spheres by three criteria: disregard of status, which leveled the playing field during rational 
argumentation; domain of concern, which secured necessary independence to discuss affairs not subject 
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to the “monopoly of interpretation” of religious, market, or government authorities; and inclusivity, 
so that everyone was able to participate. With these three criteria met, Habermas contended that the 
public sphere could facilitate the accountability of decision-making bodies, not by violence, 
coercion, order of bureaucracy, or incentives of the market, but by “the unforced force of the better 
argument” (Habermas, 1984, p. 147). I will utilize these three criteria set forth by Habermas to 
evaluate the school closing public hearings as a public sphere, and then I will apply Habermas’ 
criteria of validity claims to public testimony. 
Inclusivity was demonstrated in the wide array of speakers who testified at the public 
hearings (Table 3, page 15). Any individual who attended the hearings and wished to speak was 
afforded two minutes at the microphone, which at the very least, offered the appearance that the 
hearings had been structured to ensure that speakers’ professional or economic standing did not take 
precedence and that speakers of all status positions were regarded. By and large, speakers within and 
across the three hearings offered interpretations of school closure policy that was distinct from 
those put forward by the state; members of the public provided starkly different explanations for the 
impetus of school closure policies, and for what policies and actions should be pursued instead. In 
this way, the public hearings met noble aims of the public sphere to “uncover topics of relevance to 
all of society, interpret values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good reasons, and 
debunk bad ones” (Habermas, 1992, p. 452). Perhaps the most powerful ways that members of the 
public offered interpretations apart from the state were in the instances they offered a critical 
analysis of why schools were struggling, pointing to decades of disinvestment as well as the 
abandonment of White education policymakers (Buras, 2016; Lipman, 2013), rather than point to 
individual school failure. On these three criteria (disregard of status, domain of concern, and 
inclusivity) on a very rudimentary level, the public hearings operated very much as a public sphere. 
The five arguments the public made in demanding their schools not be closed also met the 
criteria of validity claims as Habermas advised; members of the public debated the intelligibility, truth, 
normative rightfulness, and sincerity of NYCDoE school closure proposals. In asserting that schools were 
not failing, for example, members of the public rejected the validity claims of the NYCDoE based 
on Habermas’ criteria of truth. Members of the public debated the accuracy of the statistics and also 
disputed that the data the NYCDoE referenced accurately reflected their schools. Public testimony 
highlighted alternative criteria the Department should consider when evaluating school 
performance: student and school perseverance, and the school’s relationship to and standing in its 
community.  
Members of the public also disputed the NYCDoE’s school closure proposals on grounds of 
sincerity: that school closing proposals were indeed in the interest of improving school performance. 
In many cases, members of the public asserted that the NYCDoE had ulterior motives to close 
schools in the interest of privatization, neighborhood gentrification and urban restructuring 
(Gulson, 2007; Lipman, 2011). In contrast to the NYCDoE’s framings of school closures as 
promoting school improvement and civil rights, several members of the public reframed school 
closures as racist policies that did not redress inequities in resources, power, access and opportunity, 
harkening critical race theorists who have demonstrated how whiteness as property persists (Harris, 
1993). Some accused the NYCDoE of deception, manipulation of data to support its plans to close 
schools.  
Public testifiers at the hearings also disavowed the sincerity that school closures were 
proposed to improve schools, based on the sheer fact that replacement plans were incomplete, or 
non-existent. In addition, they challenged the intelligibility of school closure plans, assessing that 
closures would negatively and disproportionately impact the most vulnerable students, leading them 
to drop out, and that surrounding schools would be negatively impacted by increased overcrowding 
and by the displacement of the least well served students. Many members of the public did not trust 
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that students attending schools proposed for closure would be afforded the opportunity to attend 
new schools that would eventually replace them. Members of the public also rejected the sincerity that 
there had been strong enough and sustained attempts to help schools succeed. They argued that 
their schools, classrooms, teachers, and students never had received comprehensive or adequate 
support, underscoring the historic and systematic race and class inequalities in education funding. 
Overall, members of the public rejected the normative rightfulness of the DOE’s authority and 
the legitimacy of the hearing process even while they participated in it. They argued that the hearing 
process, as part and parcel of the larger governance structure, was unaccountable—that it lacked 
transparency, genuine opportunities for input into decision-making, and answerability to those most 
affected by school closings. Perhaps members of the public dealt their biggest challenge to the 
validity of the hearing process itself as school closing decisions were perceived as ‘a done deal.’ In 
both issuing clear rational arguments against school closure policies, and in contesting the DOE’s 
claims, members of the public fulfilled their responsibilities as deliberative actors and members of 
the public sphere, when it is often lamented as lacking (Gutman & Thompson, 2004).  
The hearings were less successful in their fruition as a counterpublic. While members of the 
public did “identify their interests apart from the state’s interests and interpretations” (Fraser, 1990, 
p. 9), they were less potent according to the other criteria set forth by Fraser and Dawson. Recall 
that Fraser argues that in stratified societies, counterpublics have a dual character—functioning as 
spaces for withdrawal and regroupment on one hand, and as bases and training grounds for 
agitational activities directed toward the wider public, on the other (p. 68). On this latter dimension 
especially, the public hearings were limited in their operationalization as a counterpublic. Despite a 
range of robust and nuanced arguments against school closure policy, the hearings fell short of a 
counterpublic– largely because they did not facilitate “agitational activities toward the wider public.” 
Arguably, school communities were fragmented in strategy, and focused on overturning the 
individual proposal that was impacting their own schools; they were too divided to form a larger 
force against mass school closure policy. Dawson’s concerns about the limitations of counterpublics 
to inject their frameworks into the larger political system are also applicable (2006). Arguably, public 
testimony, although unanimous in opposition, was not able to reframe more dominant narratives of 
school closures. Mainstream media continues to frame school closures as a tug-of-war between 
union leaders and school district administrators (Goldstein, 2010). There are very few outlets that 
give credence to neoliberalism and market logic in public education (Burch, 2009). For example, a 
recent NPR podcast (Benderev & Marisol-Meraji, 2016) notes that school closings can happen for 
complicated reasons such as population changes and choice, which can in turn lead to loss of 
enrollment and revenue, but does not problematize the merit of nor the role market-like principles 
such as choice and competition play in public schooling (Vasquez-Helig, 2013). Exceptions are 
typically found in less mainstream papers (see, for example, Rosales, 2015; English, 2010). 
The vitality of the school closure hearings as public spheres and counterpublics cannot be 
assessed merely with the data that surfaced within the public hearings. In considering interview data 
with NYCDoE education administrators post hearings, Habermasian theory and its application gets 
blurry. For example, while structurally each speaker was afforded 2 minutes at the microphone, 
differentiating speakers by status eventually became evident. All four administrators interviewed 
regarded testimony from business leaders and students more highly for their seemingly less self-
interested positions in keeping schools open. Across interviews, administrators lumped together 
teachers and school staff who testified in support of schools remaining open, as adults preoccupied 
with their own interests (their jobs). This evidence provides support for Fraser’s theorem that 
participation in the public sphere can never be equal, because some voices will always weigh heavier 
than others, although not perhaps in all ways that Fraser may have anticipated. A BMW 
spokesperson certainly can be identified for a higher social and economic ranking, but students’ 
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discussion of how they are making a living made just as much of an impression, according to 
administrators. On this dimension, students seemingly more successfully formulated their interests 
as a counterpublic, speaking back to decision-makers and structures that do not represent their own 
interests (Scott & Fruchter, 2009).  
But this too comes unhinged. On a surface level, it may seem that School C students won 
over administrators by speaking from the heart, but their argument was deemed more powerful 
because it also tapped into a larger market ideology of schooling by underscoring the economic 
utility of public domain. This is distinct from the moral or civic utility that Schools A & B touted. 
All speakers in School C seemed convinced of the market merits in schooling, whereas speakers in 
Schools A & B rejected a core component of the market logic in assessing schools – evaluating 
individual school performance without any regard for the impact of the larger political economy. 
NYCDoE administrators espoused a market ideology by vocalizing the importance of providing 
jobs for students, as well as meeting the needs of the private sector. It is poignant to observe that 
administrators expressed concern about the private interests of teachers and unions, yet they lifted 
the voices and interests of industry partners and backed their rationale that schools not be closed for 
reasons of profit. Here we see another form of evidence of how education systems and actors 
respond to market incentives in schooling (Lubetisky, 2005).  
Yet still, the pervasiveness of the market ideology does not fully explain School C’s removal 
from the closure list. What ultimately becomes visible in School C’s case study is the secret deal 
between district and school officials—not in the public sphere but in a much more private one. 
Certainly, public hearings did create an opening for more powerful interest groups (industry 
partners) to make their claims, but what was most influential in creating conditions for dealmaking 
and to save one school from closure was the state’s own desire to reclaim the legitimacy it clearly 
lost with the public.  
Conclusion 
Public testimony contesting school closing proposals in New York City in 2009-2010 
revealed strong rational arguments such as inconsistent criteria in identifying failing schools, 
insufficient replacement plans, ulterior motives and a lack of accountability to the public. Testimony 
also challenged the validity claims of the NYC Department of Education’s school closure proposals 
on Habermasian criteria of truth, intelligibility, sincerity, and normative rightfulness. As such, 
members of the public fulfilled their responsibilities as public sphere participants. However, 
Habermas’ ideals for deliberation in the public sphere free from power differentials between 
speakers, coercion by the state, or forces by the market were proven untenable.  
Testimony across school hearings revealed divided counterpublics, not robust enough to 
agitate the larger public and reframe dominant narratives concerning school failure and closure, nor 
to hold the state accountable to all communities affected. The argument that appeared to make the 
most impact is the one that coincided with the market purpose of schooling. It may have saved this 
school from the chopping block, but it may have further legitimized other school closures and 
market-based education policies. At the end of the day, public hearings proved to be more of an 
opportunity for the state to defend its legitimacy and insist that school closings proposals were not a 
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